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No, 71"1059 OT 1971 
Kern County Land Co, y. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 
Cert to CA 2 (Friendly, Moore & Timbers) 
Section 16(b), Securities Exchange Act Case. 
Petr brought this 16(b) action to recover short .. swing 
profits made by resp, a statutory "insider." The USDC for 
SDNY (Palmieri, USDJ) entered summary judgment for petr in 
the total amount of the short-swing profits, $19,506,419.22. 
CA 2 reversed, and directed that summary judgment be entered 
for respp even though resp had not requested such relief in 
CA 2o 
In May 1967 res£, Occidental Petroleum Corp., made a 
cash tender offer for up to 1,000,000 shares of Kern County 
Land Company (Old Kern), Pursuant to this offer, by early 
June resp acquired 887,000 shares of Old Kern, for which resp 
paid over 75 million dollars. These~ purchases gave resp 
more than 20% of the outstanding shares of Old Kern, and thus 
made resp a statutory 11 insider 11 for i6(b) purposes, Old Kern's 
management quickly arranged a defense merger with Tenneco. 
Under the Old Kern .. Tenneco agreement, Tenneco was to acquire 
all the assets and business of Old Kern in exchange for shares 
of a new Tenneco Convertible Preference Stock, which was to 
be distributed to Old Kern shareholders in exchange for their 
Old Kern common stock. This agreement was approved by the 
-----~ -
Ol~er':!._ bo~~with~ oft~ ~~unce;!!Lent...9f ~sp's 
._. '-'""' 
tender offer. While the details of the Old Kern .. Tenneco --agreement were being worked out, Tenneco was also in negotia-
tion with resp. These negotiations resulted in an agreement 
by resp not to oppose the Old Kern-Tenneco merger, and the 
signing of a option agreement on June 2, 1967, less than one 
month after resp announced its tender offer. The option gave 
Tenneco the assignable right to purchase, the Tenneco shares 
that resp would receive as an Old Kern shareholder at $105 
per share, The option could be exercised at any time after 
December 9, 1967, six months and one day after resp's last 
contemplated purchase of Old Kern shares. The expiration 
date of the option was keyed to the Old Kern .. Tenneco closing 
date, For this option, Tenneco paid (non .. refundible) $10 
per share, or $8,886,230, If the option were exercised, this 
sum was to be credited against the purchase price. The only 
circumstance under which the option price was to be returned 
was the failure of the Old Kern .. Tenneco plan to close by 
July 31, 1968, over a year away. 
The Old Kern ... Tenneco agreement closed on August 30, and 
resp became irrevocably entitled to the Tenneco preference 
shares, within 4 months of its purchase of 20% of the Old Kern 
common, The IRS had ruled that the Old Kern-Tenneco transaction 
would be a tax-free exchange only if Tenneco rid itself of 
the option. Tenneco therefore sold 'the option to Loeb, Rhoades 
prior to the e,losing. On December 11, six months and three 
days after its last p~rchase of Old Kern shares, resp tendered 
its Old Kern shares for Tenneco preference shares. Loeb, 
Rhoades immediately exercised the option, paying resp $84,229,185. 
This sum, together with the nearly 9 million dollars that 
Tenneco paid for the option amd dividends received on the 
Tenneco preference shares, yielded resp a net profit of $19~ 
million. As the president of resp said to Fortune, "That 
isn't bad for two weeks • work." 
Resp knew that it was in 16(b) trouble, and believed 
that .it could get the SEC to promulgate a rule exempting it 
and other tender offerors who found themselves in the same 
situation. The SEC refused. Then, when it became apparent 
that the Old Kern-Tennec~ agreement would close within six 
months of resp's purchases of Old Kern shares, resp sought to 
delay the closing beyond the six month period by having a 
barrage of lawsuits filed in courts in Texas, California, 
and Nebraska. This, too, failed. 
In October 1967, before the exercise of the option by 
Loeb, Rhoades, and following the institution of two deriva-
tive actions by Old Kern shareholders, New Kern (a subsidiary 
of Tenneco created to receive the assets and business of Old 
Kern) filed this action under 16(b) to recover respgs short• 
swing profits. The USDC granted summary judgment for petr, --
holding, alternativelya (1) the option was a "sale" within 
the meaning of section 16(b), and (2) the exchange of Kern 
shares for Tenneco shares pursuant to the merger was a "sale" 
within the meaning of 16(b). Since both of these events 
occurred within six months of resp's "purchase" of Kern shares, 
the USDC held that either was sufficient to impose 16(b) 
liability on resp and require resp to disgorge its short-swing 
profits. 




meaning of 16(b). CA 2 held that the "sale" by resp occurred 
only when the option was exercised by the optionee, Loeb, ~.} 
Rhoades. Since this "sale" occurred more than 6 months after 
under 16(b) 
the last purchase, CA 2 held that resp was not liable/to 
the corporation of which it was a statutory "insider~ IHOOUf 
Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides thata 
1/ 
"The terms 'sale • and 10 sell 0 each include any contract to sell ,, 
or otherwise dispose of, 11 With respect to petr • s contention 
that the option agreement constituted a "sale" of Old Kern 
shares, CA 2 helda 
We recognize also that an option entitling the 
optionee to purchase is a contract to sell in XHH a 
dictionary sense. But the established rule in this 
~
circuit has been that the mere grant of an option --......_,__........,______.... . ~ . 
to purchase is not a sale for purposes of §16(b); 
~-
this occurs only when the optionee exercises the 
option, Silverman y. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2 Cir. 
1962) 
This disregard of the normal meaning of language is interesting, 
especially in light of this passage from Bershad y. McDonough, 
428 Fo2d 693, 696 (CA 7 1970), which this Court cited with 
approval this Term in Reliance Electric Co. y. Emerson Electric 
Co,, No. 70-79, decided 1/11/72a 
In order to achieve its goalsp Congress chose 
a relatively arbitrary rule capable of easy admini-
stration. The objective standard of 16(b) imposes 
-5-
strict liability upon substantially all trans• 
actions occurring within the, statutory time period, 
regardless of the intent of the insider or the 
existence of actual speculation. This approach 
maximized the ability of the rule to eradicate 
speculative abuses by reducing difficulties in 
proof. Such arbitrary and sweeping coverage was 
deemed necessary to insure the optimum prophylactic 
effect. 
CA 2 apparently believed that a transaction should not be 
considered a DIM "sale" unless it offerred some potential 
for speculative abuse. Although it may be appropriate to 
inquire into the potential for speculative abuse when faced 
with an unusual transaction which does not clearly fall 
within the statutory definition of XXD "sale," in light 
of the prophylactic purpose of 16(b) such an inquiry seems 
inappropriate if the transaction falls within the "dictionary" 
meaning of the statutory definition of "sale." CA 2 reasoned 
that resp had sold a "put" rather than a "call," and that 
I it was impossible to see how resp took unfair advantage of its position as an insider. CA 2 noteda 
As indicated, the option price was precisely 
what Occiaental's investment adviser had estimated 
the value of the Tenneco stock to be a fortnight 
before. Indeed, the option might have proved 
disadvantageous to Occidental if the Tenneco stock 
had boomed or if someone desiring to make a target 
of Tenneco had come forward with an offer to 
Occidental. The option seems to us to have been 
a straight-forward business arrangement between 
one company that found itself in the undesired posi ... 
tion of becoming "locked in" as a large minority 
stockholder and a second company that was eager 
to remove the threat this imposed, if economic 
circumstances permitted. 
Aside from the fact that it is factually inaccurate to say 
that resp was "locked in" as a minority stockholder in 
Tenneco, this analysis has nothing to do with 16(b). It 
sounds as if the CA 2 thought it was ' faced with a "sale of 
control" case. Any insider who sells within six months takes 
the risk that his sale will be "disadvantageous," because 
the stock price may go even higher, or because the company 
may become a target of several tender offerors. CA 2 really 
seems to have lost sight of what 16(b) is all about. 
With respect to petr's second contention, that the 
exchange of shares pursuant to the merger was a "sale" 
within the meaning of 16(b), CA 2 again took a "potential 
for speculative abuse" approach, and held that there was 
.... -
....___ _________ _ 
no "sale" because the exchange was forced upon resp rather -----than arranged by resp. CA 2 emphasized that resp had no -------ability to control whether or not the merger would take 
place. I think that the "potential for speculative abuse" · .. ~~ ~~ 
approach is much more appropriate here because (1) the ~~ 
statutory definition does not clearly cover an involuntary ~ 
fllr&lo\11\f -1. ~ merger 
conversion[over which a shareholder has no potential for 
control, and (2) the element of involuntariness negates the 
assumption that inside information is involved in a short 
swing purchase and sale. CA 2 recognized that an 
pursuant to a merger would be considered a "sale" 
merger was instigated by an insider with power to 




Returning to the first point, CA 2 9 s holding that the 
,~1 
/ 
sale of an option involves no potential for speculative 
this statement from Bershad is 
worth consideringa 
The insider's sale of options in his stock is 
well adapted to speculation and abuse of inside 
information whether or not the option is subsequently 
-7-
exercised. The sale of the right to purchase the 
underlying security is itself· a means of realizing 
a profit from that security. The right to purchase 
stock 'at a given price under specified circum-
stances, although clearly not identical to the 
rights attendant upon ownership of the stock itself, 
derives from and is' dependent upon the value of the 
underlying security. Sale of such purchase rights 
provides an easy vehicle for the use of inside in-
formation in extracting profits from the stock 
itself. 
I am inclined to think that the sale of an option does con- J 
tain great potential for speculative abuse. Consider this 
very case. Old Kern was trading at $63.62> when resp made 
its offer to purchase one million shares at $83.50 plus $1.50 
per share as commission for all shares tendered through a broker. 
The Old Kern-Tenneco agreement, reached eleven days after 
resp's tender offer, was worth $105.00 per Old Kern share. 
At this point, under my view of 16(b), resp was locked in 
for six months, like all insiders. I am disinclined to think 
that I would conclude that an involuntary conversion pursuant 
to the Old Kern .. Tenne6o merger would be a "sale" imposing 
16(b) liability on resp;- Hmvever, resp now owns 20% of a 
company whose shares have been tremendously inflated in 
two weeks 0 time. Assuming that resp, through access to 
inside information (this is the 16(b) irrebutable presumption), 
knows that the Old Kern shares are not worth $105, what 
does resp, locked in for six months do7 The answer is that 
he uses his inside information to obtain $9,000,000 for an 
option, knowing that the DJOIOeDXI!lXII!UIOOOIXXMXDXX Old Kern 
shares, or whatever replaces them, will not hold a $105 value, 
and knowing that the option price will enable him to cut his 
inevitable market paper losses by $9,000,000. 
-8-
CA 2 was disturbed at the prospect that resp, who had 
' . 
produced much good fcbrtune for Old Kern shareholders by 
' 
inducing this valuable defensive merger, would be excluded 
from the profits realized by all other shareholders. This 
reasoning is unsound for several reasons, First, it is in-
consistent with CA 2's conclusion that an insider who engineers 
a merger within 6 months of becoming an insider is liable 
under 16(b). Such an insider spreads just as much "good 
fortune" among the other shareholders as did resp. Second, 
it is by no means clear that the merger did produce "good 
fortune" for Old Kern shareholders. The exchange was tax 
freep and many Old Kern holders were undoubtedly long term 
investors, Most people in there position, who took "funny 
money" (convertible subordinated debentures or convertible 
preferred) from a conglomerate, soon saw their paper profits 
turn into losses of horrifying proportions, Third, the 
of the late 1960's 
damage that the frantic merger activity/did to stable financial 
markets by wildly inflating market prices outweighs any 
short term 
/good deeds that tender offerors performed, It did not take 
the government long to recognize that this merger and acquisi .. 
tion activity was detrimental to the long term health of the 
economy, 
In sum, CA 2's approach to 16(b) undercuts its salutary 
purpose, The area is very important. Although there may not 
be square conflicts inCA holdingsp theCA's do take con-
flicting approaches. 
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TO: :Mr. Justice White DATE: December 9, 1972 
FROM: l .ewts F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-1059 Kern County v. Occidental 
As you reserved your decisicm in this cue, perhaps you wW 
nat mind if I try to focus more sharply the views I expressed at the 
Conference. 
There are two questl<ms Jn the case: ( i) whether the option 
constituted a "sale" within the meaning of s 16(b); and (11) whether the 
merger*, resulting in the compelled exchange of Occidental's shares 
tn Old Kern for the shares of Tenneco, e<matituted a "sale" within the 
meaning of the statute? My under.standing at the C<mference was that 
the first question presents no diffteulty, but that you are in doult as to 
the answer to the second. It is this question, which I will address 
briefly. •• 
•The transacttc:m actually took the form of a transfer of the business and 
assets of Old Kern to New Kem (a subsidiary of Tenneco created for the 
purpoee) in exchange for preference stock of Tenneco, followd by the 
liquidation of Old Kern and distribulton in liquidation of the Tenneco shares 
to the stoctholders of Old Kern. The parties are in agreement that the 
transaetioo is the equivalent, for present purposes, or a statutory merger 
if It be assumed that all of the other elements (required vote, absenee 
ot dissenters' rights, etc.) are present. 
**Actually, I can add nothing - except my OW'Il experience - to what ts aald 
ln Oceidental's brief and to a lesser extent In Judge Friendly's optnlOD • 
....., _____ ---- ---~ ---------- ·--~---------:------~~ •. --
2. 
I beUeve the etatut tt elf eompels a negative answer to the 
question. It authorizes recovery of "any profit reaUzed by (a to% 
equtty owner} from any purchase or sale, or any aale or purchase, of 
any equity security of such lsauer • • • withm any period of less than 
six m(Xtths ••• " The ecmeept ot a purcbaae or a sale necessarily 
connotes volition, !· !: , a willing or conscious act <m the part of the 1 o% 
owner. There was no such act in this case, and the absence of it seems 
to me to be dispositive. 
The exchange o1 securities resulting from the ttznerger", was 
compelled by California law following acti<m taken by parties hostile 
to Occidental The relevant undisputed facts are as follows: 
1. The Kern-Tenneco negctiatlons. were initiated for 
the express purpose of frustrating Occidental' a tender offer, 
and they did not commence until Occidental was irrevocably 
committed to accept tenders and thereby become a .Kern 
stoekholder. 
2. The Tenneeo offer was so much higher than either the 
market price of Kern stock or: Occidental's tender offer, it was 
conceded that Occidental eould not bloek tbe merger. 
3. In fact, some 71% of Y...ern's stockholders- excluding 
Occidental .. voted for the merger. Ninety-nine percent of 
all shares v«tng at the stockholders meetblg favored the 
merger. 
4. Qectdental abstained from vctin~ announcing at the 
time that it could not make a better offer, although it would 
have preferred an OCcidental-Kern merger. 
5. California law required only a majority stockholders' 
vcte to authorize a sale of assets and liquidation (merger). 
6. California law provided no appraisal rights or any 
altemative to a Kern shareholder other than receiving the 
new stock. 
7. Oecidental reeetved exactly the same treatment 1n the 
merger as all other stockholders. 
In these eireumata.Dces, it was ccmced.ed by pet1t1011er in the 
District Court that Occidental "had no alternative, such as appraisal 
r1gbts, to acceptmgthe results (of the merger)". Respondent's brief 
p. 56. In short, there may have been a ''shotgun weddingu but there 
certainly was no sale. 
3. 
There is no controlling dee1sloo of this Court and some cmfusion 
in the language of the lower federal courts. V/e are thus free to construe 
the Act in accordance with Us term8 and purpose. In my view, these 
are C(Xltrolling. 
4. 
I think it fair to say, however, that the weight of authority in 
the lower eourts clearly supports the decision of CA 2, although each 
case must be examined in light of its speeial facts. 
Petitioner's brief states that prior to the decision in this ease, 
"a long line of f 16(b) decisions had established that an exchange of 
stock of <me company for that of another involves a 'sale' ••• " 
Petit1Ciler's brief p. 27. This statement is phrased too generally to be 
applicable to the facts of this ease. Indeed, if intended to be applicable, 
the statement is misleading. There are various types of exchanges (upon 
cmversiOJVJ, redemptions, reorganizations, etc. ) and some types are 
the legal and economic equivalent of a sale. But I lmow of no case 
whleh hole'Etbat a _E!! !!. rule must be applied to all exchanges of shares 
without regard to volition, participation by the party involve~ or the 
characteristics of the transactic.m in question. 
This is no place to discuss the lower court decisions. It ean 
be said generally that in doubtful cases - where there may be a question 
whether a transactian constitutes a npurehase or sale" -the courts 
have applied a "possibUity of abuse" test which also takes tnto considera-
tion whether the transaction was a compelled c:me. * Under this test, tt 
*See Potter's optnton in Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F. 2d 342, 346 (CA 6); 
and cases cited in Respon3tmt*s Brief pp. 55-59. 
5. 
could hardly be said that this transaction (foreed upon Oeetdentalln 
a unique factual setting) Involved either present or preeedenttal 
posstblltty of abuse. 
In short, I think a reversal here would do violence to the language 
of the Act and In no way further its pur.pose. 
Forgive me for this tntrustcm on your ''vast leisure. " 




Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: December 10, 1972 
No. 71-1059 Kem County Land Co. v. 
Occidental 
The vote at the Conference an Friday was 4 to 4, with Justice 
White reserving his vote and wtth Justice Blackmun expressing his 
view as "tentative". 
The Chief .Justice, and Justices Marshall, Rehnquist and l 
voted to affirm. l feel quite strongly that the case should be affirmed 
and that a reversal would be a serious distortian of the letter and intent 
of § 18(b) of the 1934 Act. 
Accordingly, I will want to write regardless of whether Justice 
White comes down on my side. As I led the dlseussian at the Conference, 
I would think the chances are good that the opintoo would be assigned 
to me U we have a majority. If I am in the minority, I will wish to 
dissent. 
This is Larry's case, but in view of his other obligatlans, I 
hope you. will be agreeable - with his approval - to taking over in hts 
place. 
l think the opinion will be a fairly easy one to write. There 
are two clear-cut questions, both well briefed. 
I _ ... .,..._ .........,._..... __ .......... __ -c _____ _ , _____ ,. ___ ., - .... __ .. 
2. 
All members of the Court with the exception of Justices Douglas 
and Brennan were 1n aeeord thtl.t the option agreement did not constitute 
a sale. Petitioner relies on the Bershad ease ( CA 7), whteh was etted 
tn a footnote in Emerson Eleetrie, 404 U. S. 417, 423. The Bershad ease 
is easily distinguished, as the option there was in reality a spurious 
one. 'lbe down payment was large (15%) the option ran for only two 
moo.ths, the optionee was immediately given a proxy to vote the stock, 
the optionee also went on the board of directors, the option price was 
below the market priee, and there was no possibility of the down payment 
being retumed under any etreumstanees. 
As to the seecmd point (whether the "ne rger" resulted in a "sale"), 
I refer you to my memorandum of this date to Justtee White. 
I wUl be happy, of eourse, to discuss any aspect of this with 
you. There 1s obvious advantage in our etreulattng a draft at a fairly 
early date. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. w 'HITE 
~u:puntt <!f'trttrl trf tlrt 'J!lttittb j;tatta 
'Ulaafringhttt, ~. <If. 2llc?~ql . 
December ll, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 71-1059 -Kern County Land Company v. 
Occidental Petroleum Cor,p . 
I had intended to vote to affirm in this case but 
did not do so at conference. My hesitation was 
occasioned by my thought that the option was the major 
issue in the case, only to discover that two of the 
Brethren considered the exchange, rather than the option, 
determinative. The question in that respect is closer 
than I thought, but I still can't accept an involuntary 
exchange occasioned by merger as a "sale" for the pur-
pose of§ l6(b). 
.• ,. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.§up-rtttU <qo:mt o-f tltt ~nitt~ .ihdta 
._aaftitt.gton. ~. <q. 2lrc?)!.~ 
December 11, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 71-1059 - Kern County Land Co. v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. 
My vote at the conference on this case was to re-
verse, but the vote was tentative. On further study of the 
matter over the weekend, I am now tentatively inclined the 
other way. This is prompted by a conclusion, still some-
what unfirm, that the exchange of stock, compulsory as it 




~u.prrnte <!fourt of t~e 'Pttilib ~tates­
'J)trasJrbtgtcn. p. Qt. 2llbi'1,3 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS March 7, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE: 
In due course I will circulate a 
dissent in 71-1059, Kern County Land Co. v. 







· Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
" 
It is possible that I may do a short concurrence limited specifically 
to the status of a compelled exchange by virtue of a merger. I know from 
my own experience that the practicing bar would like more definitive 
guidance on this hazy area. It may well be that nothing constructive can 
be added to what you have said already, but if I can find the time I may 
take a look at it. 






.I v .JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 8, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1059 - Kern County Land Co. v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely,L 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: Conference 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Larry A. Hammond DATE: March 10, 1973 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
. No. 71-1059 Kern County v. Occidental " -·---
Here is a draft of a proposed concurrence in Kern. 
I know you have not studied this carefully, and in view of your 
other priorities I do not want you to go back to the books or even the briefs. 
Merely take a look at what I have written and see whether you think it 
hangs together. 
I am in about 95% accord with Justice White's opinion, but it does 
seem to me that he applies unnecessarily the "possibility of abuse" test 
when in fact this was a "compelled" exchange, over which Occidental 
had no control or influence whatever. 
I know from my professional experience that this is an area which 
creates considerable doubt and confusion. My concurrence will not help 
much, but it may put the question which lawyers usually are called upon 
to answer in a little sharper focus. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
Dear Byron: 
No. 71-1059 Kem Coonty Land Co. 
Occidental Petroleum 
1 am' thinking of filing a concurrence in Kern County along the 
lines of the enclosed draft, unless you prefer that I net do so. 
I think you have written a fine opinion. The purpose of my 









JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
§nprntt:t <Court llf tltt ~t.h ,§t'a.tts 
'Jfagtrhtgtttn, !i}. <!J. 2Llp}(.,S 
March 12, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1059 - Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp 
Dear Lewis: 
I have no objection whatsoever to your filing the 
concurrence appended to your note of March 12. 
/ 
With respect to your first point--whether we should 
inquire into the "possibility of abuse 0 --it must be 
remembered that when Occidental extended its tender offer 
on May 11, it was already a 10% shareholder of the company. 
At least with respect to the shares acquired thereafter I 
would suppose the inquiry would be appropriate. If there 
was a possibility of abuse, whether these shares obtained 
by the tender offer should be treated as having been 
obtained all at one time or at separate times is a ques-
tion unresolved by cases in this Court. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHA"'BERS OF' 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j;u.pumt <!Jcurt of tqe ~ni.ttb jShtfts 
'Jlirut!yinghm. lB. <!J • . 20b!'!~ 
March 30, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1059 - Kern County v. Occidental 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely, 
h 
Mr. Justice White 





JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~n:vrmtt ~ourt cf tqt 'Jilnittlt ~tattn 
Jfa:nJringtcn. ~. ~· 20pi~.;1 · 
April 3, 1973 
71-1059 - Kern Cty. Land Co. 
v. Occidental Petroleum 
Dear Bill, 
Please add my name to your dissent-
ing opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
.itttrftntt QJ01trt of tltt 1!lnitc~ .§tufca 
~aalyin:gt!!tt.ll'l. <!f. ZO?J~~ . 
CHAMBEfS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. April 4, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1059 Kern County Land Co. v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent in the 
above. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
(_' " 
y /'~{ ( ' 
...... 
'---
• .. ~;.;t·:;: 
No. 71-1059 Kern County Land Co. v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
Dear Byron: 
I write to reaffirm my joining in your opinion for 
the Court, and to say that I probably will not file the brief 
concurring opinion which I drafted. Thus, if everyone has 
voted and the case is ready to come down, it can be cleared 
at our April 13th Conference. 
Sincerely, 
cc: The Conference 
1 w 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.§uvumt <!Jettrt cf tlrt 'Jllttili~ ~taf.eg 
._Mfrittgtcn. ~. <!J. 20~J!.~ 
April 5, 1973 
) 
Re: No. 71-1059 - Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum 
Dear By,. 
1-'lease join me. 
Sincerely, 
;!. [t.. ;J-
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
· CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~lt.}ttnm <!Jouttllf tltt 'Jttiteb .itws 
'J!laslpngto:n.JB. <!}. 'zrtc?)t.;l 
May 3 , 1973 
/ 
Re: No . 71-1059 -Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me . 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice White 




















































































































































































To: The Chie~ Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglaa 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr . Justice Stewart 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
· Justice Blackmun 
./.' Justice Powell 
Tustice Rehnquist 
From: White, J. 
1st DRAFT 
Circulated: 3 _ t,; _ z-3 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Recirculated: 
Xo. 71-1059 
Kern County Land Company. 
Petitioner. On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
v. 
OccidC'n tal Petroleum 
Corporation. 
of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 
lMarch -. Hl731 
MH. Jt'STICE \YHI'l'E delivered the op1mon of the 
Court. 
Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
48 Stat. 896. 15 U. S. C. ~ 78p (b).' provides that officers. 
directors. and holders of more than 10% of the listed 
'"For thr pmpo~r of prennting thr unfair u~r of information 
ll'hirh mn~· hn ,.r brrn obtninrd by such brnrfirinl owner. dirrrtor. or 
offirrr b~- rr:1;;on of his relntionship to thr i ~~ur r, nny profit rrnlizrd 
h" him from nn~- purrhnsr nnd ~ulr, or nn~· snlr nnd pmrhn~<>. of nn~· 
<'(Ill it~- ~('Cill'it~· of SUC'h i~Sllet• rot hn t hnn f\ n ('Xf'Inptrd S('Cttrit ~·j 
\\'ithin nn~· period of lrss than six month~. unlrss . nrh srrmit~· wns 
11cqnirrrl in good fnith in ronnrction with n debt previously ron-
t rnrtrd. shnll imtrr to :mel br rrco\'Nnhlr by the i~suN, irrrsprrtin' 
of nnY intrntion on the pnrt of such brnrfirinl owner, dirrrtor, or 
offirN in rnt rring into such trnnsart ion of holding thr s<>rurit~· pm-
C'hased or of not repnrchnsinp; the sermit~r sold for n period rxrrrcling-
~ix months. Suit to recovrr surh Jlrofit ma~· be institutrd nt Jnw or 
in rquit~· in any court of competent juri~ctirtion h~· the is<"ttPr, orb~· 
thr owner of an~· srcurity of the i<"suer in thr name and in behalf 
of the i<"snrr· if th<> issuer shall fail or rrfu~e to bring such snit 
\\·ithin si:-..i~· dn~·s aft<>r reque~t or shall fail dilig:rntly to pro<"rcute 
thr l"ame thNraft<>r; bnt no such suit shnll be brought more than 
two ~-rars nftrr the dntr surh profit was rrnlizrd. This snb~rrtion 
~hnll not br construed to cover nny trnnsnrtion whrre surh brnrfirinl 
ownrr was not surh both nt. the timr of the purchaf:e nncl snlr, or 
-----
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stock of any company shall be liable to the company for 
any profits realized from any purchase and sale of such 
stock occurring within a period of six months. Unques-
tionably, one or more statutory purchases occurs when 
one company, seeking to gain control of another, acquires 
more than 10% of the stock of the latter through a tender 
offer made to its shareholders. But is it a § 16 (6) 
"sale" when the target oHtender offer defends itself by 
merging into a third company and the tender offeror 
then exchanges his stock for the stock of the surviving 
company and also grants an option to purchase the latter 
stock that is not exercisable within the statutory six 
months period'? This is the question before us in this 
case. 
I 
On May 8, 1967, after unsuccessfully seeking to merge 
with Kern County Land Company (Old Kern),~ Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation (Occidental) " announced 
an offer, to expire on June 8, 1967, to purchase on a first-
come, first-served basis 500,000 shares of Old Kern com-
the snle nne! purcba~r, of the seruritr invoh·ecl, or an~· tr~111~nction 
or trnn;,:actionH which the Commission b~· rule~ and reg;ulations ma~· 
rxrmpt ns not romprchenclrd within thr purpo~r of this sub~ect ion." 
15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). 
2 Old Kern wns a California corporntion hnving ;.;11hstanti;tl rral 
rstntr holdings, including oil producing In ncb, oil rxplora tion net il·i-
tiE's, cattlE' ranching;, caitlE' fpeding operations. and intrrr~ts in the 
mnnufacturc of automotive P<lrt~, clrctronir sy~tcms nnd dr,·icrs, 
and farm mnchinrr~· :-tnd construction equipment. After the re-
org:mizntion described in text, Old Kern became known a~ the 600 
California Corporation until its cYcntunl dis~olution llnclrr California 
law on October 6, 1967. 
"Ocridrntal is rrs]1ondcnt· in this Court. A California corpora-
tion with its principal plarc of businE'ss in Cnlifornia, Occidrnt nl i~ 
rngag;rd in the production and snlr of oil, ga~, coal, sulphur. and 
fertilizers. 
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mon stock ' at a price of $88.50 per share plus a broker-
age commission of $1.50 per share." By May 10, 1967. 
500,000 shares. more than 10% of the outstanding shares 
of Old Kern.6 had been tendered. On May 11, Occi-
dental extended its offer to encompass an additional 
500.000 shares. At the close of the tender offer, on 
June 8, 1967, Occidental owned 887,549 shares of Old 
K ern.' 
Immediately upon the announcement of Occidental's 
tender offer, the Old Kern management undertook to 
frustrate Occidental 's takeover attempt. A management 
letter to all stockholders cautioned against tender and 
indicated that Occidental's oft"er might not be the best 
available. since the management \vas engaged in merger 
discussions ,,·ith several companies. When Occidental 
4 Thr Old Krrn stork wa~ rrp:i ~terrd punmnnt to § 12 of tlw Rr-
rurit ir~ and Exrhnnp:r Art of 19:34, as amrnded, 15 U. S. C. § 78. 
The stork waH a nonrxempt, r(Jttit~' ~rrurit y for purposr ;; of § 16 (b) . 
" Thr Old Krrn ~tork closrd at 63% on Frida~·, Ma~' 8, 1967, thr 
la ~ t. 1 radinp: dn~· prior to thr amlmmcrmr nt of thr tendrr offrr. Tt 
had renrhrd n high of ()-1-% and n. low of 57% in 1967. a high of 761/4. 
and a low of 51% in 1966. n high of 71% and a low of .')6 in 19fl5, 
:md a high of 70% :mel a low of 56'Y!-! in 1964. Tl1Us, thr 885 pr r 
;:hnrr trndrr offer price rrprr8rnlrd a substantial profi t for ~harr­
holder>< of Old Krrn. 
n On l\In~· 10, Old K ern hnd 4,328,000 "harrs out standing. 
7 On Mn~· IS, 1967, Ocridrntnl fil r d a Form ::!, Initi:ll Statrmrnt 
of Hrnrfirinl OwnrrRhip of Srruritie;;, with 1 he Srruritirs and Ex-
rh:mgr Commi~s ion indirnting dirret ownrrship of 507,055 shnrrs of 
Old Krrn stock ; on .June 9, 1967, Oceidrntnl filrd n Form 4, Statr -
mrnt of Chnnges in Benrfirinl Ownrrship of Sccuritirs. for thr month 
of '\1a ~·, indicating thr purchase of nn additional ::!76.326 8harrs of 
Old K ern o; tock. for a 1otnl ownership as of Ma~· ::!1, 1967, of 83.381 
;:hares. An additional 4.168 shnres wNr purchn F<rd h~· .Tunr 8, 1967, 
~o that nF< of .Tunr 30, 1967 , Ocridrntal hrld 8S7,549 share.~ of Old 
Krrn ~tork. This figure inrludrd 1,900 shnrrs whirh Orridrntal pur-
rha~rd on thr oprn markrt in April 1967. Section 10 (b) linbility 
i" not n s~rrtrd with rrspcct to thr~r shnre~ , because thrse purrhn srs 
diclJlot mnkr Occidental a "bmrfiri:~l owner" for pmposrs of§ 16 (b). 
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extended its tender offer, the president of Old Kern sent 
a telegram to all stockholders again advising against 
tender. In addition, Old Kern undertook merger dis-
cussions with Tenneco, Inc. (Tenneco) ,8 and, on May 19, 
1967, the Board of Directors of Old Kern announced that 
it had approved a merger proposal advanced by Tenneco.9 
Under the terms of the merger, Tenneco would acquire 
the assets, property, and goodwill of Old Kern, subject 
to its liabilities, through "Kern County Land Company" 
(New Kern),10 a new corporation to be formed by Ten-
neco to receive the assets and carry on the business of 
Old Kern. The shareholders of Old Kern would receive 
a share of Tenneco cumulative convertible preference 
stock in exchange for each share of Old Kern common 
stock which they owned. On the same clay, May 19, 
Occidental, in a quarterly report to stockholders, ap-
praised the value of the new Tenneco stock at $105 per 
share.11 
8 Tenneco, a Delaware corporation, is a diversified indust rial com-
pany with operations in natural gas transmi~sion, oil and gas. chrmi-
cals, packaging, manufacturing, and shipbuilding. Tenneco is not 
a party to this litigation. 
!J Although technically a sale of assets, the corporate combination 
has been consistently referred to by the parties as a "merger" and 
will be similarly denominated in this opinion. The only significance 
of the characterization is the fact that a sale of assets requirrd. under 
California law, approval of only a majority of the Old Kern share-
holders and provided no appraisal rights for dissenters. 
1.o New Kern, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in California, is petitioner in this Court and iR a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Tenneco Corporation. Tenneco Corporation is, 
in turn, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco and owns all of the 
capital stock or controlling interests in most of Tenneco's non-
pipeline operating subsidiaries. When first incorporated, New Kern 
was known as KCL Corporation. 
11 The annual dividend of $5.50 per share on the new Tenneco 
stock would be more than double the current annual dividend of 
$2.60 per share on the Old Kern stock. Each share of 1 he new 
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Occidental , seeing its tender offer and takeover attempt 
being blocked by the Old Kern-Tenneco "defensive" 
merger, countered on May 25 and 31 with two mandamus 
actions in the California courts seeking to obtain ex-
tensive inspection of Old Kern books and records. 1 ~ Re-
alizing that, if the Old Kern-Tenneco merger were ap-
proved and successfully closed, Occidental would have to 
exchange its Old Kern shares for Tenneco stock and 
would be locked into a minority position in Tenneco,. 
Occidental took other steps to protect itself. Between 
May 30 and June 2, it negotiated an arrangement with 
Tenneco whereby Occidental granted Tenneco Corpora-
tion, a subsidiary of Tenneco, an option to purchase at 
$105 per share all of the Tenneco preference stock to 
which Occidental would be entitled in exchange for its 
Old Kern stock when and if the Old Kern-Tenneco merger 
was closed.13 The premium to secure the option, at $10 
per share, totaled $8,866,230 and was to be paid immedi-
ately upon the signing of the option agreement.14 If the 
Tenneco preference stock was convertible into 3.6 shares of Tenneco. 
common stock. During 1967, Tenneco common stock had sold at a 
high of 32% and a low of 20%. Moreover, in contrast to Occi-
dental's cash offer, the Tenneco exchange was expected to be, and 
was ultimately approved by the Internal Revenue Service as, free 
of capital gains tax. 
1 2 Prior to any court ruling on Occidental's mandamus petitions,. 
Old Kern voluntarily permitted inspection of Old Kern's general 
ledger, consolidated financial statements, consolidated journal entries, 
details of cash receipts from oil operations, supporting trial balances, 
and other records over a six-day period . A Jist of stockholders, 
however, was withheld. 
1 'l The agreement covered 886,623 shares. This figure is 926· 
shares lrss than the number of Old Kern shares ultimately owned by 
Occidental. Thi · discrepancy apparently results from un cert ainty 
as to the number of shares tendered. 
HAn outside investment banking firm in New York had deter-
mined thnt between $9 and $12 per share was n fair premium on an 
optioll on t he Old Kern stock. 
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option were exercised, the premium was to be applied to 
the purchase price. By the terms of the option agree-
ment, the option could not be ex~rcised prior to Decem-
ber 9, 1967, a date six months and one day after expiration 
of Occidental's tender offer. On June 2, 1967, within six 
n10nths of the acquisition by Occidental of more than 
10% ownership of Old Kern, Occidental and Tenneco 
Corporation executed the option.1 " Soon thereafter, Oc-
cidental announced that it would not oppose the Old 
Kern-Tenneco merger and dismissed its state court suits 
against Old Kern.'r. 
The Old Kern-Tenneco merger plan was presented to 
and approved by Old Kern shareholders at their meeting 
on July 17, 1967. Occidental refrained from voting its 
Old Kern shares, but in a letter read at the meeting 
Occidental stated that it had determined prior to June Z 
not to oppose the merger and that it did not consider the 
plan unfair or inequitable.17 Indeed, Occidental incli-
cated that, had it been voting, it would have voted in· 
favor of the merger. 
Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
had refused Occidental's request to exempt from possible 
'"On thai date, rmd on the d:1te of the exrrrisc of the option, 
Old Kern common stork \YUS sellin~J; at· approximately $95 prr :-hare .. 
'" Srekin~J; to pre,·ent its acquisition of Tenneco shnres pur~uant 
to the merger from being mntchrd with thr ~nle of thosr ~harrR upon 
exercise of the option for pmpo~es of estahli~hin~J; § 16 (b) linbility, 
Ocridental nskrd t hnt the nrw Tenneco stock not be immedint el~· 
registered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Exrhangc Art of 1984, 
15 lT. S. C. § 7Re. SeC' 4.'i0 F. 2d, at 160, n. 6. 
17 The lC'tter indirntC'd thnt Occidentnl "did not ron~idcr it to he 
in its brst interest, or thC' bC'st interrRt of its Rhareholder~. or i he 
hr~t intC'rr~t of KCL ShnrC'holclC'r~ grnernll:v for it to ropposr] the 
transnction." HowC'Yer, Occidental stnted th:1t. "riln view of the fnct 
that we wonlcl rather have \\·orkccl out our own tmnRaction with KCL, 
WC' shnll not Yotc om KCL shares at the KCL SharrholdPr'~ MrPting 
on .Tnl.v 17, 1967." Under npplicable California law, the absiC'ntion 1\! 
from Yoting \\'ilR tantamount to opposing the mrrgcr. R 1 
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~ 16 (b) liability Occidental's exchange of its Old Kern 
stock for the Tenneco preference shares that would take 
place when and if the merger transaction were closed. 
Various Old Kern stockholders, with Occidental's inter-
ests in mind. thereupon sought to delay consummation 
of the merger by instituting various lawsuits in the state 
and federal courts." These attempts were unsuccessful, 
however. and preparations for the merger neared comple-
tion with an Internal Revenue Service ruling that con-
summation of the plan would result in a tax-free exchange 
with no taxable gain or loss to Old Kern shareholders 
and with the issuance of the necessary approval of 
the merger closing by the California Commissioner of 
Corporations. 
The Old Kem-Tenneco merger transaction "·as closed 
on August 30. Old Kern shareholders thereupon became 
irrevocably entitled to receive Tenneco preference stock, 
share-for-share in exchange for their Old Kern stock. Old 
Kern was dis~olvecl and all of its assets, including "all 
claims, demands, rights and choses in action accrued or 
to accrue under and by virtue of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 ... ," were transferred to New Kern. 
The option granted by Occidental on June 2, 1967, was 
exercised on December 11, 1967. Occidental, not having 
previously availed itself of its right, exchanged certificates 
representing 887,549 shares of Old Kern stock for a 
certificate representing a like number of shares of Ten-
neco preference stock The certificate was then endorsed 
over to the optionee-purchaser, and in r~n $84,229,185 
\\·as credited to Occidental's accounts at various banks. 
Adding to this amount the $8,886,230 premium paid in 
June, Occidental received $93,905,415 for its Old Kern 
stock (including the 1,900 shares acquired prior to is-
suance of its tender offer). In addition, Occidental re-
'' Thi~ his I or~' or this litigation is reviewed in 600 California Cm·7J. 
Y. II arjean, 284 F. Supp. 843 (ND Tex. 1968). 
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ceived dividends totaling $1,793,439.22. Occidental's 
total profit was $19,506.419.22 on the shares obtained 
through its tender offer. 
On October 17, 1967, New Kern instituted a suit under 
§ 16 (b) against Occidental to recover the profits which 
Occidental had realized as a result of its dealings in Old 
Kern stock. The complaint alleged that the execution 
of the Occidental-Tenneco option on June 2, 1967, and 
\ 
the exchange of Old Kern shares for shares of Tenneco to 
which Occidental became entitled pursuant to the merger 
closed on August 30, 1967, were both "sales" within the 
coverage of § 16 (b). Since both acts took place within 
six months of the elate on which Occidental became the 
owner of more than 10o/o of the stock of Old Kern, New 
Kern asserted that § 16 (b) required surrender of the 
profits realized by Occidental.'!! New Kern eventually · 
moved for summary judgment, and, on December 27, 
1970, the District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of New Kern. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570 (SDNY 1970). The District 
Court held that the execution of the option on June 2, 
1967, and the exchange of Old Kern shares for shares of 
Tenneco on August 30, 1967, were "sales" under§ 16 (b). 
The Court ordered Occidental to disgorge its profits plus 
interest. In a supplemental opinion, Occidental was also 
ordered to refund the dividends which it had received 
plus interest. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered 
summary judgment entered in favor of Occidental. 
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F . 2cl 157 
(CA2 1971). The Court held that neither the option nor 
1n Occidental answered asserting various affirmative dcfen~cs and 
counterclaims. Two suits had already been instituted by Old Kern 
shnreholders, and one was subsequently begun. The four suits were 
consolidated. 
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the exchange constituted a "sale" within the purview of 
~ 16 (b).20 We granted certiorari. 405 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
We affirm. 
II 
Section 16 (b) provides, inter alia, that a statutory in-
sider 21 must surrender to the issuing corporation "any 
profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or 
any sale and purchase, of any equity security 22 of such 
issuer ... within any period of less than six months." 
As specified in its introductory clause, § 16 (b) was en-
acted "[f]or the purpose of preventing the unfair use of 
information which may have been obtained by a [stat-
utory insider] ... by reason of his relationship to the 
issuer." Congress recognized that short-swing specula-
tion by stockholders with advance, inside information 
would threaten the goal of the Securities Exchange Act 
20 In view of its disposition, the Court of Appeals did not reach 
Occidental's contentions that only the purchases in excess of 10% 
of Old Kern's stock, rather than all purchases made pursuant to 
the tender offer, should be included in calculating liability and that 
the awards of prejudgment interest and dividends were improper. 
Occidental also appealed from the dismissal of its counterclaims. The 
Court of Appeals dismissed Occidental's appeal as moot. 
21 For purposes of § 16 (b), a statutory inRider includes a "bene-
ficial owner, director, or officer." 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). The term 
"beneficial owner" refers to one who owns "more than 10 per centum 
of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) 
which is registered pursuant to section 781 [§ 12] of this title." 
15 U. S. C. § 78p (a). 
22 The term "equity security" is defined to incl11de "any stock or 
similar security; or any security convertible, with or without con-
sideration, into such a security, or carrying auy warrant or right 
to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or 
right; or any other security which the Commission shall deem to 
be of similar nalure and consider necessary or appropriate, by such 
rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for 
i he protection of investors, to treat as an equity security." 15 
U. S. C. § 78c (a) (11). 
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to "insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets." 
15 U. S. C. § 78 (b). Insiders could exploit informa-
tion not generally available to others to secure quick 
profits. As we have noted, "the only method Congress 
deemed effective to curb the evils of insider trading was 
a flat rule taking the profits out of a class of transactions 
in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be in-
tolerably great." Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Elec-
tric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972). As stated in the 
report of the Senate Committee, the bill aimed at pro-
tecting the public "by preventing directors, officers and 
principal stockholders of a corporation ... from specu-
lating in the stock on the basis of information not avail-
able to others." S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Con g., 2d Sess., 9 
(1934).~3 
2 " The legi~lative histor~r of § 16 (b) reveals a congre~sionnl effort 
to curb short-swing trading by insic!N:; whose po~it ion gin's thrm 
ncre~s to iuformation llot :ll'ailable to the inve~ti11g public and the 
abilit ~· to infturnrc rorpomte polir~'· 
"Among the most vicious prnrticrs unrarthrd at the hearing~ brfore 
the wbrommittee wns the fbgrant betrn~·nl of thrir fidurinr~· clntirs 
b~r dirrrtor" and offirrrs of corporation~ who w•rd their position:; of 
t n1~t. nne! thr confident in! informal ion which eame to thrm in snrh 
po.-it'ion~, to nid them in thrir mnrkrt activities. Clo~rl.v nllircl to 
this type of nbu~c was the unscrupulous emplo~·mrnt of in~icle infor-
m:-ttion b~· large ~toekholders who, while not direetors nne! ollicrrs, 
cxcrri,.ed sufficient control over the drstinies of their rompnnieR to 
ennhle thrm to acquire and profit by information not nvai lnble to 
othrr~." S. Rrp. No. 1455. 73cl Con g., 2cl Ses,- .. 55 ( 1934). 
Sec a],.o 10 S. E. C. Ann. Rep. 50 (1944): R. Rrp. No. 79~, 73cl 
Cong. , 2cl Ses"., 9 (1934). 
"The Securities J<.xchange Act of 1984 aims to protect the interr~ts 
of the public· again~t 1 hr prcdntor~' opernt ionR of director~. ofllcrrs, 
and principal stockholclrr" of corporations by pre,·enting them from 
sprcula ting in the ~tock of the corporations to which 1 he~· 011·e a 
fiduriar~· dut~' . 
"BY this section [16 (b) I it is rcnderrcl unlawful for per~on~ in-
1ru~trcl with the administration of corporate affairs or vc~trcl with 
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Although traditional cash-for-stock transactions that 
result in a purchase and sa e or a sale and purchase within 
the six-month. statutory period arc clearly encompassed 1 
"·ithin the purview of ~ 16 (b), the courts have wrestled I 
" ·ith the question of inclusion or exclusion of certain 
"unorthodox'' transactions."' The statutory definitions 
~
~uhHtanti:1l control over corporation~ to n"r in~idr in format ion for 
thrir oll'n ach·:mtagP." ~. Hrp. No. 1455, 7:3d Cong., 2cl Sr"s., fiR 
(1984). 
ThP pnrpo"r nnd operntion of§ 16 (b) wa~ rxplained :1~ follo\l·s by 
onr of it~ draftomen. 
"Thn t. r§ 1fi (b )l is to prr\·cnt di1wt or~ l'PC'Piving thr hrnrftt R of 
"hort-trrm sprculntiw RwingH on the sec111'itir~ of thrir own rom-
pnnieR. becnu~r of inRide informnt ion. Thr profit on Rurh tr:msnc-
t ion under the bill would go to the corpomt ion. You hold thr dirrr-
tor. irresprctivr of nn~· intrntion or exprctntion to Rell thr i'rrnrit~· 
within 6 months nftrr, brrau~e it will br nbsolute!~r impossihlr to 
pron• the exiRtrnrr of Rnrh intrntion or rxprrtation. :1ncl ~·ou hnvr to 
hrwe this rrudr ntlr of thumb. hecnusr ~·ou r:mnot unc!Prtnkr the bur-
drn of having to provr that thr director intendrd. ~t the time he 
bought, to get out on n Rhort Rwing." Hr:1ring" heforr Sennte Com-
mittrr on Banking and CmTrnr~·. 7:'lcl Cong., 2d ScRs .. (i51)7 (1984). 
Ser genrrnll~· Henrings on H. R. 7R52 :mel H. R. 8720 brforr thr 
1Ton~r Committer on Intrr"tate nnd Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 
2d Se,s., 85 (19:~4): Hearings on S. R4, A. 56, nne! S. 07 hrforr thC' 
Srnatr Commit ter on Bnnking nnd Cnrrenc~·, 72cl Cong., lst Srss., 
:mel 73d Cong., 1st nncl 2d SrRs., fi4fi3-fiMn (1934): S. Rep. No. 
792, 73d Cong., 2cl Sess .. 7-9 (1934); S. Rep. No. 145!\, 78d Cong., 
2d Sr~R., 5.1-GR (1934); H. R. Rrp. No. 13R:3, 73d Cong., 2d Re~s., 
I:~-14 (1934). Srr nlso B/rm v. Lamb. 368 F. 2d 507 (CA2 19fi6): 
8mnlove Y. Delendo Corp., 136 F. 2d 231 (C.\2 1943); Yourd. Trnd-
ing in Seemitirs b~· Directors, Officers nnd Stockholclrr~: Section 16 
of the SrcuritieE< ExchnngC' Act, 3R Mich. L. Re,·. 138 (l!J89); 
Meekrr & Cooney, The Problem of Drfinition in Determining In-
sidrr Li:1bilitie~ Under Section 16 (b), 45 Vn. L. Rev. 949 (19.'i9); 
"\"otr. Stock Exrhangrs Pur~nnnt to Corporntr Con~oliclntion: A 1 I 
Rrrtion 16 (h) "Pmchnsr or Sale?," 117 U. P:1. L. Rrv. 1084 (19fi9). 
2
4 The term comes from 2 L. Loss, Seeuriti Regulation 1069 (2cu · 
rd. 1961) and hns been applied to stock conversions, exchnngcs pur-
su:mt to mrrgers nnd other corporate reorganizations, stock rrrln8~i­
firations, and dealings in options, rights, nnd warrants. 
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of "purchase" and "sale" are broad and, at least arguably, '? 
reach many transactions not ordinarily deemed a sale or 
purchase.2" In deciding \vhether borderline transactions 
are within the reach of the statute, the courts have come 
to in uire whether the transaction may serve as a vehicle 
f~r the evil which _Ql~~vent-the reali-
zation of short-swing profits based upon access to inside 
information/6 thereby endeavoring to implement con-
2 " "When used m this chapter, unless tho context otherwise 
requ1res-
"(13) the terms 'bu ~·' and 'purchase' each include an~· rontru..ct to 
buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire. 
"(14) the terms .'sale' or 'sell' each include an~· contract to srll or 
othrrwise dispose of." 15 U.S. C. §§ 78c (a) (13), (14). 
26 Several decisions hnvr been rrad as to npply n so-called "objec-
tive in interpreting and applying Section 16 (b)." Sec, e. g., 
Smolove "· Delendo Corp., 136 F. 2d 231 (CA2), ccrt. denied, 320 
U.S. 751 (1943); Park<.~ Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F. 2d 984 (CA2), 
cert. dcnird, 332 U. S. 761 (1947); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 
F. 2d 156 (CA3 1965). Under some broad language in those de-
cisions, § 16 (b) is said to be applicable whether or not the transac-
tion in question could possibly lend itself to the types of speculative 
a.buse that the statute was designed to prevent. By far the greater ) 
w~ty is to the effect that a "12ragmatic" approach to 
§ 16 (b) will best serve the statutory goals. See, e. g., Roberts v. 
Eaton, 212 F. 2d 82 (CA2), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 827 (1954); 
Fen·aiolo v. Newman, 259 F. 2d 342 (CA6 1958) , cert. denied, 359 
U.S. 927 (1959); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F. 2d 304 (CA9), 
cert. denied, 382 U. S. 892 (1965); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F. 2d 507 
(CA2 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Petteys v. Butter, 
367 F. 2d 528 (CAS 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967). For 
a discussion and critical appraisal of the various "approaches" to 
the interpretation and application of § 16 (b), see Lowenfels, Sec-
tion 16 (b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 Conn. 
L. Q. 45 (1969); Note, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate 
Consideration: A Section 16 (b) "Purchase or Sale?," 117 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1034 (1969); Note , Relinncc Electric nnd 16 (b) Litiga-
tion: A Return to the Objective Approach?, 58 Va. L. Rev. 907 
(1972); Gadsby & Treadway, "Recent Developments Under Section 
16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 N. Y. L. Forum 
687 (1971). 
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gressional objectives without extending the reach of the 
statute beyond its intended limits. The statute requires 
the inside short-swing trader to disgorge all profits real-
ized on all "purchases" and "sales" within the specified 
time period, without proof of actual abuse of insider in-
formation, and without proof of intent to profit on the 
basis of such information. Under these strict terms, the 
prevailing view is to apply the statute only when its ap-
plication would serve its goals. "[W]here alternative &!~ 
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those {! . 
terms are to be given the construction that best serves 
the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing specu-
lation by corporate insiders." Reliance Electric Co. v. 
Emerson Electric Co., supra, at 424. See Blau v. Lamb, · 
363 F. 2d 507 (CA2 1966), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 1002 
(1967). Thus, "[i]n interpreting the terms 'purchase' j tf ~ 
and 'sale,' courts have properly asked whether the par- ~ -
ticular type of transaction involved is one that gives 
rise to speculative abuse." Reliance Electric Co. v. 
Emerson Electric Co., supra, at 424, n. 4. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Occidental 
became a "beneficial owner" within the terms of § 16 (b) 
when, pursuant to its tender offer, it "purchased" more 
than 107'o of the outstanding shares of Old Kern. We (") ~ 
must decide, however, whether a "sale" within the ambit j ...JlA.J 
of the statute took place eithe~ Occidental became 
irrevocably oun rn 
for s ares o enneco pursuant to the terms of the 
merge~eement between Old Kern and Tenneco-or 
whe ~gave an option to Tenneco to purchase 
from Occidental tlie Tenneco s 1ares so acqmre . -
27 Both events occurred within six month:; of Occidental's first 
acquisition of Old Kern shares pursuant to it:; tender oiler. Although 
Occidental did not exchange its Old Kern shares until December 11, 
1967, it is not contended that that dale, rather than the date on 
which Occidental became irrevocably bound to do so, should con-
trol. Similarly, altliough the option was not exerci~ed until Decem-
ber 11, 1967, no liability is asserted with respect to that event, be-
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III 
On August 30, 1937, the Old Kern-Tenneco merger 
agreement was signed, and Occidental became irrevocably 
entitled to exchange its shares of Old Kern stock for 
shares of Tenneco preference stock. Concededly the 
transaction must be viewed as though Occidental had 
made the exchange on that day. But even so, did the 
exchange involve a "sale" of Old Kern shares within the 
meaning of § 16 (b)? We agree with the Court of Ap-
peals that it did not. for we think it totally unrealistic 
to assume or infer from the facts beforeustliat cc1 ental 
e!.t.ber had or was like~ave access to inside informa-
tion, by reason of its ownership of more than 10%, of the 
outstandmg s 1iifeSOT" Old Kern, so as to afford it an 
opportunity tor~, short-swing profits from 
its disposition within six months of its tender offer 
purchases. 
When, on May 8, 1967, Occidental made an irrevocable 
offer to purchase 500,000 shares of Old Kern stock at a 
price substantially above market, it cannot be con tended 
that Occide11tal was then an insider. At that time, it 
owned only 1,900 shares of Old Kern stock, far fewer than 
the 432,000 shares needed to constitute the 105-'o owner-
ship required by the statute. There is no basis for find-
ing that, at the time the tender offer was commenced, 
Occidental enjoyed an insider's opportunity to acquire 
information about Old Kern's affairs. 
It is also wide of the mark to assert that Occidental, 
as a sophisticated corporation knowledgeable in matters 
of corporate affairs and finance, knew that its tender 
ofier would either succeed or would be met with a "de-
fensive merger." lf its takeover efiorts failed, it is 
argued, Occidental knew it could sell its stock to the 
<'HU~r it occurred more than six months after Oreidental'H ln~t ncqui-
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target company's merger partner at a substantial profit. 
Calc·ulations of this sort. however, "·hether speculative 
or not and whether fair or unfair to other stockholders 
or to Ole! Kern, do not represent the kind of speculative 
abuse at which the statute is aimed, for they could not 
have been based on inside information obtained from 
substantial stockholclings that did not yet exist. Accept-
ing both that Occidental made this very prediction and 
that it \Yould recurringly be an accurate forecast in 
tender-offer situations/x we nevertheless fail to perceive 
how the fruition of such anticipated events would re-
quire, or in any \\"ay depend upon, the receipt and m:e 
of inside information. If there are evils to be redressed 
hy way of deterring those who \\"Oulcl make tender offers, 
~ 16 (b) does not appear to us to have been designed for 
this task. 
B Ma acquired more than 
ern. t was thus 
~~~~~~~~--~~~~~ a statutory ms1der w1en, on ay 1, it extended its 
tender offer to include another 500,000 shares. We are 
quite unconvinced, however, that the situation had 
changed materially with respect to the possibilities of 
speculative abuse of inside information by Occidental. 
Perhaps Occidental anticipated that extending its offer 
~' Althou~h a "defrn~ive rnrr~er" is onr tart ic nvnilnble to inrmn-
IJrnt mnna~rmrnt in it~ :ll"~rnal of anti-trndC'I' ofTrr wrapon~. it is 
b~· no mrnn~< n forrgone conclusion that it is the re~pon~r that will 
hr most often, much lr~~< invariably, em11lo~'rd. Inrumbrnt manage-
m<•nt. might, for instanrr, choosr to exhort sh:1rrholder::; not to tendrr, 
rmploy various techniqurs to rlevatr the markrt prier of thr com-
pany's stock in order to make the trndC'I' offer It·~~ attractiw, insti-
t utr lrgnl proceedings, or incren~e the company's outstanding ~tock. 
Any one of thesr drvires might provr more attmrti\·c to incumbrnt 
mnn:tgernrnt thnn a clefen~ive mrrgrr which could pro\·r to br highly 
drtrimental to thr rntrrpri~r. Ser Notr, Drfensivr Tnrtics Em-
plo)·rd b~· Inc-umbent M:m:tgrmrnts in Contesting Trncler Offers, 
21 Stan. L. Rrv. 110-l (1969). 
' . 
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would increase the likelihood of the ultimate success of 
its takeover attempt or the occurrence of a defensive 
merger. But again, the expectation of such benefits was 
unrelated to the use of information unavailable to other 
stockholders or members of the public with sufficient 
funds and the intention to make the purchases Occidental 
had offered to make before June 8, 1967. 
The possibility that Occidental had, or had the oppor- ~ 
tunity to have, any confidential information about Old 
Kern before or after May 11, 1967, seems extremely re-
mote. Occidental was, after all, a tender offeror, threat-
ening to seize control of Old Kern, displace its manage-
ment, and use the company for its own ends. The Old 
Kern management vigorously and immediately opposed 
Occidental's efforts. Twice it communicated with its 
stockholders, advising against acceptance of Occidental's 
offer and indicating prior to May 11 and prior to Occi-
dental's extension of its offer, that there was a possibility 
of an imminent merger and a more profitable exchange. 
Old Kern's management refused to discuss with Occi-
dental officials the subject of an Old Kern-Occidental 
merger. Instead, it undertook negotiations with Ten-
neco and forthwith concluded an agreement, announcing 
the merger terms on May 19. Requests by Occidental 
for inspection of Old Kern records were sufficiently frus-
trated by Old Kern's management to force Occidental to 
litigation to secure the information it desired. 
There is, therefore, nothing in connection with Occi-
dental's acquisition of Old Kern stock pursuant to its 
tender offer to indicate either the ~sibility of inside 
information being available to Occidental by virtue of 
i~wnership or the potential for speculative abuse 
of such inside information by Occidental. Much the 
same can be said of the events leading to the exchange of 
Occidental's Old Kern stock for Tenneco preferred, which 
is one of the transactions that is sought to be classified 
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a "sale" under § 16 (b). The critical fact is that the ex- f 
change took place and was required )Ursuant to a mero·er 
be ween 1 ern an enneco. That merger was not . --,.....__ 
engm~red oy cc1 ental but was sought by Old Kern 
to frustrate the attempts of Occidental to gain control 
of Old Kern. Occidental obviously did not participate 
in or control the negotiations or the agreement between 
0 ern an en 1eco. . l\ ewmark v. RKO General,. 
425 F. 2d 348 ( CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 ( 1970) ; 
Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F. 2d 984 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 332 U. S. 761 (1947). Once agreement between 
those two companies crystalized, the course of subsequei1t 
events was out of Occidental's hands. Old Kern needed 
the consent ·~ as it turned out, Old 
Kern's management had the necessary votes without the 
affirmative vote of Occidental. The merger agreement 
was approved by a majority of the stockholders of Old 
Kern, excluding the votes to which Occidental was en-
titled by virtue of its ownership of Old Kern shares. See 
generally Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F. 2d 342 (CA6 
1958), cert. denied, 359 U. S. 927 ( 1959) ; Roberts v. 
Eaton, 212 F. 2d 82 (CA2 1954). Occidental, although 
registering its opinion that the merger would be beneficial 
to Old Kern shareholders, did not in fact vote at the 
s~ at whi~h merger approval wasOb-
tained. Under California law, its abstention was tanta-
mount to a vote against approval of the merger. More- I 
over, at the time of stockholder ratification of the merger, 
Occidental's previous dealing in Old Kern stock was, as 
it had always been, fully disclosed. 
Once the merger and exchange were approved, Occi-
dental was left with no real choice with respect to the 
future of its shares of Old Kern. Occidental was in no 
position to prevent the issuance of a ruling by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service that the exchange of Old Kern 
stock for Tenneco preferred would be tax-free; and, 
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although various la\Ysuits were begun in state ancl federal 
courts seeking to postpone the merger closing beyond 
the statutory six months period, those efforts were futile. 
The California Corporation Commissioner issued the nec-
essary permits for the closing that took place on Au-
gust 30, 1937. The merger left no right in dissenters to 
secure a )raisal of their ~ Occidental could, of 
course, have disposed of Its s 1ares of Old Kern for cash 
before the merger was closed. Such an act "·otllcl have 
been a § 16 (b) sale and would have left Occidental with 
a prima facie § 16 (b) liability. It \Yas not, therefore, a 
realistic alternative for Occidental as long as it felt that 
it could successfully defend a suit like the present one. 
See generally Petteys v. Butler, 367 F. 2d 528 (CAS 
1966). cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1006 ( 1967); Fermiolo v. 
Newman, supra; Lyman v. Livingston, 276 F. Supp. 104 
(Del. 1967); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 
(SDNY 1951). We do not suggest that an exchange of Jf 
stock ursuant to a merger may never result in ~ 16 (b) ) 
)ia!Jilitv. But t 1e involuntary nature of Occidental's 
exchange, when coupled with the absence of the possi-
bility of speculative abuse of inside information. con-
vinces us that § 16 (b) should not apply to transactions 
such a.s this one. 
IV 
Petitioner also claims that the Occidental-Tenneco op-
tion agreement should' itself be considered a sale either 
because it was the kind of transaction the statute was 
designed to prevent or because the agreement \\·as an 
option in form but in fact a sale. But the mere execu- J A 
tion of an option to sell is not generally regarded as a. V { 
"sale." See Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F. 2d 1 
(CAl 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, 309 
F. Supp. 75 (Wis. 1970); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. 
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Y. Andreas, 230 F. Supp. !162 (RD~Y Hl65). And we 
do not find in the execution of the Occidental-Tenneco 
option agreement a sufficient possibility for the specula-
tive abuse of inside information with respect to Old Kern's 
affairs to warrant holding that the option agreement was 
itself a "sale" ".:ithin the meaning of ~ 16 (b). The 
mutual advantages of the arrangement appear quite clear. 
As the District Court found, Occidental wanted to avoid 
the position of a minority stockholder with a huge in-
vestment in a company over which it had no control and 
in which it had not chosen to invest. On the other hand, 
Tenneco did not want a potentially troublesome minority 
stockholder that had just been vanquished in a fight for 
the control of Old Kern. Motivations like these do 11ot 
smack of insider trading; and it is not clear to us, as it 
was not to the Court of Appeals, how the negotiation 
and execution of the option agreement gave Occidental 
any possible opportunity to trade on inside information 
it might have obtained from its position as a major 
stockholder of Old Kern. Occidental wanted out, but 
only at a date more than six months hence. It was will-
ing to get out at a price of $105 per share, a price at which 
it had publicly valued Tenneco preferred on May 10 
\\'hen the Tenneco-Old Kern agreement was announced. 
In any event, Occidental was dealing with the putative 
new owners of Old Kern who undoubtedly knew more 
about Old Kern and Tenneco's affairs than did Occi-
dental. If Occidental had leverage in dealing with Ten-
neco, it is incredible that its source was inside informa-
tion rather than the fact of its large stock ownership 
itself. 
Neither does it appear that the option agreement, as 
drafted and executed by the parties, offered measurable 
possibilities for speculative abuse. What Occidental 
granted was a "call" option. Tenneco had the right to 
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buy after six months, but Occidental could not force 
Tenneco to buy. The price was fixed at $105 for each 
share of Tenneco preferred. Occidental could not share 
in a. rising market for the Tenneco stock See Silverman 
v. Landa, 306 F. 2d 422 (CA2 1966). If the stock fell 
more than $10 per share, the option might not be exer-
cised, and Occidental might suffer a. loss if the market 
further deteriorated to a. point where Occidental was 
forced to sell. Thus, the option, by its very form, left 
Occidental with no choice but to sell if Tenneco exer-
cised the option, which it was almost sure to do if the 
value of Tenneco stock remained relatively steady. On 
the other hand, it is difficult to perceive this speculative 
value to Occidental if the stock declined and Tenneco 
chose not to exercise its option. See generally Note, 
Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 69 Yale L. Rev. 868 (1960); Filer, 
Understanding Put and Call Options, 96-111 (1959); 
Leffler, The Stock Market, 363-378 (2d ed. 1957). 
The option, therefore, does not appear to have been 
an instrument with potential for speculative abuse, 
whether or not Occidental possessed inside information 
about the affairs of Old Kern. In addition, the option 
covered Tenneco preference stock, a. stock as yet unissued, 
unregistered, and untraded. It was the value of this 
stock that underlay the option and that determined 
whether the option would be exercised, whether Occi-
dental would be able to profit from the exercise, and 
whether there was any real likelihood of the exploitation 
of inside information. If Occidental had inside informa-
tion when it negotiated and signed the option agreement, 
it was inside information with respect to Old Kern. 
Whatever it may have known or expected as to the future 
value of Old Kern stock, Occidental had no ownership 
position in Tenneco giving it any actual or presumed 
insights into the future value of Tenneco stock. That 
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was the critical item of intelligence if Occidental was to 
use the option for purposes of speculation. Also, the 
date for exercise of the option was over six months in the 
future, a period that, under the statute itself, is assumed 
to dissipate whatever trading advantage that might be 
imputed to a major stockholder with inside information. 
See Note, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporation 
Consolidation: A Section 16 (b) "Purchase or Sale?,". 
217 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1034, 1054 (1969); Silverman v. 
Landa, 306 F. 2d 422 (CA2 1962). By enshrining the 
statutory period into the option, Occidental also, at least 
if the statutory period is taken to accomplish its intended 
purpose, limited its speculative possibilites. Nor should 
it be forgotten that there was no absolute assurance that 
the merger, which was not controlled by Occidental, 
would be consummated. In the event the merger did 
not close, the option itself would become null and void. 
Nor can we agree that we must reverse the Court of 
Appeals on the ground that the option agreement was in 
fact a sale because the premium paid was so large as 
to make the exercise of the option almost inevitable, par-
ticularly when coupled with Tenneco's desire to rid itself 
of a potentially troublesome stockholder. The argument 
has force, but resolution of the question is very much a 
matter of judgment, economic and otherwise, and the 
Court of Appeals rejected the argument. That court 
emphasized that the premium paid was what experts had 
said the option was worth, the possibility that the mar-
ket might drop sufficiently in the six months following 
execution of the option to make exercise unlikely and the 
fact that here, unlike the situation in Bershad v. M c-
Conough, 428 F. 2d 693 (CA7 1970) , the optionor did not 
surrender practically all emoluments ..tm4 ownership by ~ 
executing the option. Nor did any other special circum-
stances indicate that the parties understood and intended 
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that the option was in fact a sale."9 ·we see no satis-
factory basis or reason for disagreeing with the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals in this respect. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
So ordered. 
""In Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F. 2d 693 (CA7 1970), thP 
dcfcndnnts were director~ and greater-than-ten-percent stockholders 
of Cudahy Company. The defendant~. within ~ix months of their 
acqui8ition of beneficinl ownership of Cudahy, granted an option to 
Smelting Refining and Mining Company to purchase their Cudnh:v 
1-'tock. The Se1•enth Circuit held that the p;rnnt of the option was a 
~Hi (b) "sale" of the Cudahy stork. The Court of Appeals in the 
present cn~c Jistinguishcd Bershad as follows: 
"That. case came before the court of appeals on a finding b)· the 
district court that, under the circum~:;tances there pre~entrd, the stock 
had in fact been sold within the six months prriod, although the 
option was not formal!~· exercised until later. The di~trict comt 
had relied on a number of circumstances, the most significant being 
that the optionor gaYe the optionee an irreYocable prox~· to vote the 
~hare~ and that. the opt ion or and one of hi~ as~oriatr directors re-
signed as directors within a few days after the grant of the option 
nnd were replaced b)' officers of the optio11ce. In other words, thr 
district court found in effect that the 'option' w:1s aceompnllicd b)• :1 
wink of thr c~·e, and the comt of nppcal~ sustained this. Here thrrc 
is no such finding, and no basis for one." 450 F . 2d, at 165. 
·. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the opinion of the Court, but write briefly to 
supplement what has been said as to whether the Old Kern-Tenneco 
merger coostitute a "sale" by respondent wlth1n the mean1ng of 
· §16(b). • The purpose of§ 16(b) is clear and the relevant language 
of the Act is explicit. There have been few problems in the customary 
type of transaction where truddauU.ftla11Ja an identifiable "1nsider" 
purchases or sells stock for cash. But, as the opinion of the Court 
noted, the courts have had difficulty with the question whether to 
include or exclude certain "unorthodox" transacticm.s (supra at 11), 
and certainly a counsel advising clients with respect to such 
\ 




*The transaction actually took the form of a transfer of the business 1' 
and assets of Old Kern to New Kern (a subsidiary of Tenneco created \\ 
for the purpose) 1n exchange for preference stock of Tenneco, followed 
by the liquidation of Old Kern and the distributicm 1ft liquidation of 
the Tenneco preference shares to the stockholders of Old Kern. The 
parties are in agreement that the transaction is the equivalent, for 
purposes of deciding the § 16(b) issue in this case, of a statutory 
merger, and it has been denominated in the briefs, oral argument 
and opinion of the Court as a merger. 
. .. 
2. 
guidance* • In view of the wide variety of such transactions and 
the circumstances under which they are accomplished, it is simply 
not feasible .. certainly in the absence of greater refinement in the 
statutory definitions or the applicable x•s•W•• regulations - to 
enunciate guidelines that would provide the type of certainty which 
the law normally should afford with respect to commercial 
transactions. 
A number of courts have applied a "pragmatic approach 
factually oriented as the best means of implementing the statutory 
goals of § 16(b).** The inquiry under this approach, often a 
difficult and even subjective one, is whether the particular 
*Tlie mOst typical example of "unothordax" transfers or exchanges 
of securities include those resulting from mergers, sales of assets 
pursuant to plans of liquidation (other corporate reorganizaticms, 
stock reclassifications, conversions, redemptioos and-the like. 
See 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1069 (2d ed 1961). 










transaction is susceptible of the short-swing profit abuse by insiders 
against 
which is the evilfivhich Congress legislated. I can suggest no 
sounder nor more specific method of analysis as a general approach 
to the merger type transaction. It seems to m~ however, that the 
Court need n<X have reached the inquiry made in the "pragmatic" 
cases. That inquiry, as stated in the Court's opinion today is whether 
"Occidental either had or was likely to have access to insider 
information, by reason of its ownership of more than 10% of the 
outstanding shares of Old Kern, so as to afford it an opportunity 
reap speculative, short-swing profits from its dluMar••""'••• 
•MpcaW II••" disposition within six months of its tender officer 
of purchases. " SUp~ at 14. 
I agree fully with the Court that it is "totally unrealistic" 
to assume or infer that Occidental has any such access to inside 
information. But under the facts in this case, this inquiry is 




that Occidental possessed any such information at the time it 
commenced its tender offer. It was then k wholly an outsider, 
possessing no way of obtaining information other than that generally 
available to the public. The inquiry, under a different factual 
situation, would have been quite pertinent after OCcidental acquired -
I 




~ outstanding shares of Old Kern. 
'' I  
I I 
But here the transaction which is said to have constituted a 
"'sale" was a merger in which respondent took no part whatever. 
/ 
, It neither controlled, engineered nor even voted for the merger. 
Indeed, the record is undisputed that petitioner negotiated the 
:D11J merger for the very purpose of frustrating respoodent 's 
ambiti0111 to acquire a ex controlling position in Kern. Or, putting 
it differantly, respondent was an adversary of the parties who 
planned .'and consummated this merger. Regardless of the extent 
to which he1 may have had "inside information", he could neither 
block the1 merger • nor assure its consummation. The coo.version 
5. 
of respondent's shares in Old Kern into New Kern resulted from the 
consequences of the merger under California law. There was no 
act of volition .. indeed no relevant act at all .. on the part of 
respondent with respect to the accomplishment of the merger. 
The concept of a purchase or a sale necessarily connc:tes some 
v olition, b !·, a willing or conscious act on the part of the 10% 
owner to accomplish a change {by purchase, sale, exchange or 
otherwise) a change 1n his investment. There may well be close 
cases where the investment change results, as it does in a merger, 
from the operation of law In which a 1 O% owner is in fact an insider 
who significantly influences the merger decision under circumstances 
where the"posstbillty of abuse" test must be applied. But this is 
no such case. 
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